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FOR EWORD
This study was performed by Serendipity, Inc., Eastern Operations
Division, under National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) contract
number NASW 1825. The work was done under the auspices of the Office of
Advanced Research and Technology, NASA Headquarters, specifically for the
Biotechnology and Human Research Division.
The objective of the study was to identify human factors research
programs which would support civil aviation and be suitable for accomplishment
by NASA research centers. Aviation problems formed the basis for the research
program recommendations and, accordingly, problems were identified, ranked
and briefly defined in an informal report to the project monitor and other cog-
nizant NASA personnel. The sources for this problem foundation were
literature reviews and extensive interviews with NASA and non-NASA
personnel. An overview of these findings is presented as the first chapter of
this report.
Research recommendations were developed by considering national
aviation issues in concert with high ranking problems mentioned above. These
considerations generated twenty research program recommendations
covering the fields of:
Information Technology,
Crew Factors,
Training,
Psychological-Physiological Research, and
Supporting Research.
Chapters II and III of this report deal respectively with the Development of
Human Factors Programs and Research Program Resumes. An Appendix
provides detailed information on the civil aviation problems which formed the
basis for the human factors research recommendations. Specific coverage
includes: complete listing of all problems considered as candidates; the
method and data used to select those problems warranting research atten-
tion; and, brief discussions, including references, of the human factors aspects
L
of the selected problems.
A special NASA committee provided guidance to the efforts of the
study team. Committee members included:
Steven E. Belsley
Charles Lewis
Robert P. Taylor
James Patton
Randall Chambers
Richard Miner
Allan Merkin
Ames Research Center
Flight Research Center
Langley Research Center
Langley Research Center
Langley Research Center
Electronic Research Center
NASA Headquarters
Many other technical personnel from the NASA gave extensively of their time
to contribute to the development of the research objectives reported in this
document.
Allan Merkin
Technical Monitor
NASA
Walton L. Jones
Director
Biotechnology and Human Research Division
NASA
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CHAPTERI
HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS IN CIVIL AVIATION
GENERAL
It was intended that the human factors research program resulting
from this study be responsive to the problems confronting civil aviation.
Accordingly, the initial work focused on identifying and ranking aviation
problems. The steps used in developing this problem foundation are
listed below and discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
1. Review trade journal literature to obtain a nucleus of problems
to support initial interviews.
2. Interview non-NASA experts to expand and validate the prelimi-
nary problem listing.
3. Interview NASA experts to obtain their views on the developed
listing.
4. Administer questionnaires and open-ended mailings to augment
the interview data.
5. Select the most critical problems on the basis of frequency of
mention by:
a. Trade journal literature, and
b. NASA and non-NASA interviews and mailing results.
6. Review all problems for possible combination on the basis of
technical relationship.
7. Associate most critical problems with aircraft types of concern.
8. Describe each problem in terms of the cost, safety and effec-
tiveness factors which justify its inclusion as an item in the
research foundation.
Brief amplifications of these steps and the results of applying them
are discussed briefly in the remainder of this chapter and more extensively
in the Appendix, Human Factors Problems in Civil Aviation.
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AVIATION PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
A nucleus of aviation problems was compiled through a review of trade
journal literature. Expert opinion, obtained through interview and question-
naire, was used to verify existing listings, provide additional listings and to
obtain criticality data on all listed items. The process of developing this
problem listing was facilitated by the following classification scheme.
Category N,
Crew-Aircraft Interface
Air Traffic Control
Aviation-Community Interface
Medical-Psychological
Selection and Training
Maintenance
Crash Survivability
Miscellaneous
Total
Descriptive titles for specific problems
in Section I of the Appendix.
o. of Problems
( 39)
(9)
(14)
( 35)
( 16)
(2)
(7)
(9)
131
of each category are presented
SELECTION OF MOST CRITICAL PROBLEMS
A concensus of literature and expert opinion similar to that used in the
initial identification of problems was used to select from the entire problem
listing those which were most worthy of research attention. Thirty-eight of
the 131 problems received significant percentages of the literature and inter-
view votes. The small number of votes and their relatively even distribution
across problems precluded a precise ranking. However, the selected prob-
lems are listed below in the order indicated by the voting scheme. Section II
of the Appendix discusses the selection technique, presents the voting data,
and the results of consolidating three separate rankings.
2
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PROBLEM LISTING (In Order of Ranking)
Problem Title Original Number
Air Traffic Controller Workload
Approach and Landing
Collision Avoidance
Cockpit Instrumentation
Handling Characteristics
Allocation of Functions
Passenger Comfort and Convenience
Pilot Assist Devices
Compatibility of Regulations with User Needs
Enroute and Terminal Information
Crashworthiness
Human Factors Design Principles/Data
Aviation Weather
Pilot Proficiency and Procedural Knowledge
Performance Decrement and Environmental Factors
Standardization
Non-adherence to Standard Operating Procedures
Maintenance Ineffectiveness
Hijacking and Bomb Threats
Required Simulator Improvements
Pilot Manpower Shortage
Fatigue
Aircraft Noise
Turbulence
Sonic Boom
Insufficient Emphasis on Social Factors in Aviation
Attentiveness
Pilot Workload
Stress
3
Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
(II-1)
(I-18)
(I-17)
(I-28)
(I-2)
(I- 1)
(III-13)
(I-9)
(VIII-2 )
(I-8)
(VII- 1 )
(I-12)
(I-21)
(V-2)
(I-39)
(I-10)
(I-35)
(III-3)
(III-9)
(V-10)
(IIi- 1)
(IV-7)
(III-6)
(I-3)
(III-5)
(III-14)
(IV-15)
(I-7)
(IV-8)
I
PROBLEM LISTING (In Order of Ranking) (Contd.)
Rank Problem Title Original Number
30. Human Factors Involvement in Aircraft Certification (I-25)
31. Use of Simulators in Checkouts and Proficiency (V-3)
32. Task and Aircraft Design Simplicity (I-29)
33. Faulty Cockpit Layout (I-15)
34. Voice Communications (I-11)
35. Readiness Self-Test (IV-14)
36. Ego as an Accident Cause (IV-31)
37. Accident/Incident Feedback (V-7)
38. Aircraft Handbooks (V-8)
HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEM STATEMENTS
Generally speaking, the problems selected by the majority as most
pressing were aviation problems with implied human factors issues. It
was, therefore, necessary to explicate the human factor themes within
each problem. The results of this explication are presented in Section III
of the Appendix as brief human factors problem statements.
In their present form, the problems are quite general and association
with aircraft type is one means of providing more detail. For example,
Problem 1-39, Performance Decrement Attributable to Environmental
Factors, can be thought of as emphasizing vibration and noise in helicop-
ters; anoxia in light aircraft; and humidity and temperature in transport
types. Or if Problem 1-21, Aviation Weather, is associated with light air-
craft, the research area concerns training and education; when considered
in the context of helicopters, the research theme could be avionics; and
with air carrier operations, the research concern might be terminal area
visibility.
Table 1 summarizes the applicability of the selected problems to one
or more of seven aircraft types.
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SUMMARY OF INITIAL STUDY EFFORT
The result of this initial study effort is a set of aviation problems
whose underlying human factors issues have been extracted and described
in the Appendix. Where identifiable, the cost, safety and effectiveness
implications of these problems are included in these descriptions.
The second half of this study transformed this problem foundation
into human factors research programs. The results of this transforma-
tion are reported in Chapters II and III of this report dealing respectively
with the Development of Human Factors Research Programs and Resumes
of the Recommended Research Programs.
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CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH PROGRAMS
TECHNIQUE ILLUSTRATION AND SUMMARY RESULTS
The recommended research programs presented in this chapter were
based on: expert opinions obtained during interviews and via literature re-
views; the concept of national aviation issues; new developments in aviation;
and the top-ranked problems emerging from the initial study effort. The
largest influence in developing the research recommendations was a sys-
tematic consideration of problems and the following national issues:
* Approach and Landing
* Air Traffic Control
* Collision Avoidance
* Crashworthiness
* Training and Proficiency
* Aircraft Noise and Sonic Boom
· Congestion
An illustration of this "issue -- problem interplay" is presented below
for Approach and Landing. The numbered items are some of the relevant top-
ranked problems, and the notes indicate the background material suggested
by their combination with Approach and Landing.
APPROACH AND LANDING
1. Cockpit Instrumentation - new development of third generation
ILS, Pilot Factor study, display
problem study by Human Research
Laboratory, USAF
2. Handling Characteristics - new rating scale, general aviation
stall/spin accident rates, C. W.
Harper on future aircraft systems,
and reports linking handling with
landing accidents
8
3. Visual Illusions - Vision studies by Boeing, FAA
and Fitts.
4. Fatigue, Stress - "Landing Short" paper, ATA/Aero-
med paper, FRC studies on stress
5. Aviation Weather - NASA and FAA All weather landing
work, ALPA paper on breakout
The systematic consideration of national issues, aviation problems
(emphasizing the concensus set), and the relevant research resulted in
the following twenty research program recommendations.
HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH
PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Information Technology
1. All Weather Landing Studies
2. Collision Avoidance
3. Advanced Display Concepts
4. Data Link Displays
5. Air Traffic Controller Information Processing
B. Crew Factors
1. Man-Computer Interactions
2. Human Factors Influencing Handling Characteristics
Assessment
3. Visual Cues in Landing
4. Variability of Manual Aircraft Control
5. See and Be-Seen Improvements
6. Fatigue, Stress and Workload
C. Training
1. Advanced Simulator Employment Concepts
2. Visual and Motion Advancements
3. Training for Cognitive Performance
4. Training Requirements Guidelines
9
D. Psychological-Physiological Research
1. Human Response to Aircraft Noise and Sonic Boom
2. Personnel Impact Protection
3. User Needs in Air Travel
E. Supporting Research
1. Human Factors Data Techniques
2. Man-Machine Allocation
RESEARCH PROGRAM ORGANIZATION
The charter of NASA's aeronautical research is currently under
study by the Civil Aviation Research and Development (CARD) committee. *
While no formal pronouncements have been made as yet, it would seem
that NASA's aviation research will continue to stress basic research,
applied studies, and proof of concept or product feasibility efforts. A
human factors version of these types of research and development is pre-
sented in Figure 1 and discussed briefly below.
Human Performance Technology
Objectives of this research area are to develop and experimentally
investigate hypotheses (suggested by basic research findings) on new roles
for man in aviation. This category also includes the development of tech-
niques and apparatus to support these objectives.
Man-Rated Mechanizations
The ultimate applications of many engineering innovations either
support human performance or are controlled by a human operator. This
area establishes the compatibility of these advanced mechanizations with
the capabilities and limitations of man. The objectives are to assess com-
patibility in terms of total system performance attainable (acceptable or
· As described in the minutes of the January 1970 meeting of the NASA
Research and Technology Advisory Committee on Aeronautics.
10
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marginal) and to provide recommendations for modification where appro-
priate..
Human Performance Improyement
This area is an advanced version of human performance technology.
The concern remains with the man but the products sought are human
factors design -standards and principles as opposed to hypotheses or research
issues. The intention is to develop these producs' to be supportive of avia-
tion system design, test, and certification.
Human-System Integration
This research area is responsible for determining thile degree to
which man's and the community's needs are met by aviation, systems and 
where mismatches are found to provide authorities with evidence of the
fault and principles for resolution.
.* 
These statements of scope for each research area are necessarily
quite broad. A.more definitive indication of the program's intentis
realizable by associating the twenty research program recommendations
with the appropriate research category. The results of this association
are shown in Figure 2. While the development of basic research programs
was not a requirement of this study, illustrative types of human basic
research were taken from a Navy study* and are included in Figure 2 for
comprehensiveness. Resumes of the twenty research programs recom-
mended in this study are presented in the next and final chapter of the
report.
COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDED RESEARCH AND AVIATION PROBLEMS
The aviation problems presented in the initial part of this report were
intended to be requirements for the research programs being developed.
* A Study of Human Factors Research and Development Activitiep in the
Navy's RDT and E Program, DCNO (Development), November 1962,
Tolcott, et al.
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The degree to which the recommended research responded to these require-
ments is indicated in Table 2, a research program x aviation problem
matrix. The recommended research programs satisfy or respond to rele-
vant problems in varying degrees. Some accounting of this variation is
shown in the body of the matrix of Table 2 through the use of the following
legend:
X - full or direct relationship between problem and research
as in All Weather Landing System studies and Aviation
Weather problems.
P - recommended research covers only a part of the problem,
e.g., handling characteristics research is only one aspect
of the turbulence problem and even then the recommended
research is not specifically directed toward turbulence.
G - indicates a general relationship wherein the recommended
research could be directed to solve the referenced problem.
The research programs interact with 28 of the 38 aviation problems.
Four of the ten omitted problem statements are so broad and interacting
that the overall intent of the recommended research might be thought of as
responsive. These problems are:
1. Human Factors Design Principles and Standards
2. Standardization
3. Human Factors in Aircraft Certification
4. Task and Aircraft Design Simplicity
Four* of the remaining six problems appear more compatible with the re-
search charters of other government agencies such as Department of Trans-
portation and Department of Labor. The fifth and sixth problems, Main-
tenance Ineffectiveness, and Aircraft Handbooks, are symptoms of poor
information technology and training both of which are addressed at a
general level in the overall research program.
.,.
Hijackings and Bomb Threats, Pilot Manpower Shortage, Readiness Self-
Test, and Ego as an Accident Cause
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TABLE 2. RECOMMENDED RESEARCH VS.
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Aviation Problems
a
a~
01
-C
C-
g
~q
la
'C
C
ct
a
a
C
,!
2-
2
C)
c
auC)
0 
r
C
C,
C.
C)
a
U
I
a.
a`
I
I :.
a
a
a
c
L
a
.
I-C
IC
a
.E
c I
;
a
a
C
C
C-
j -
7
I
-r
V
Ca
C
cr
C
a:
?
u~
a 
C
C
a5
a
a:
w
I
.a
C-
i7
a
I
I
d
C)
v.
a
a
a
C
C
C
a.
C
a
c
C
0-
C
I-
vC.
c
II
a
Ie
I
w
U
4:
0
_.
E
a
C
r-
>t-
C,
w
a
C
C
r
C)a
I-
2
M
C
0
0
U
'S
4c-
Air Traffic Controller Workload x c;
Approach and Landing X P G XX (;
Collision Avoidance X X
Cockpit Instrumentation G P X P
Handling Characteristics x x x
Allocation of Functions X X.
Passenger Comfort & Convenience x
Pilot Assist D)evices X X X
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CHAPTER III
RESUMES OF RESEARCH PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The recommended research programs identified in the preceding
chapter are discussed in some detail in the following text. Specific
topics covered in each resume are a statement of objective including
justification and a suggested research approach. Each program writeup
includes supporting references which were chosen for their accessibility
as well as for their relevance.
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A. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
1. All Weather Landing System (AWLS) Studies
2. Determine Pilots' Role and Information
Requirements for Collision Avoidance Systems (CAS)
3. Advanced Display Concepts and Principles
4. Determine the In-Cockpit Requirements Associated
With ATC Data Link Concepts For the 1980s
5. Air Traffic Controller Information Processing
17
A-1 ALL WEATHER LANDING SYSTEM (AWLS) STUDIES
Objective
Among the many National Airspace System (NAS) capabilities pre-
scribed by the Alexander report, scanning beam micro-wave ILS 1 is slated
to play an important role in increasing the capacity of high density airports
by permitting reduced spacing between parallel runways and between landing
aircraft. The objective of the AWLS research program is to begin defini-
tion of the cockpit configuration for this advanced landing system and to con-
tinue work on perfecting displays, control dynamics, and procedures for the
conventional AWLS.
Approach
I. Conventional AWLS
The Ames Research Center has begun a series of simulator projects2
to develop and test solution concepts (changes in flight instrumentation, crew
preparation, and system operating procedures) for flight management tasks
which are suspect when supported only by the baseline low visibility landing
system. Accordingly, suggested approaches are not provided.
II. Cockpit Requirements for Advanced ILS
(1) Review the operating concepts and characteristics of the scanning
beam micro-wave ILS 3 and devise candidate display-control configurations
for the airborne element.
(2) Recommend modifications to existing simulators, and develop
scenarios and experimental designs to exercise the hypotheses of the candi-
date configurations.
(3) Conduct experimentation, analyze data, and provide recommenda-
tions in the following areas:
* Crew roles/procedures
* Cockpit configuration (control systems, presentation
systems)
18
* System performance projections, e. g.,
* touchdown variability
·vertical control
* azimuth control
*increased airport capacity
19
A-2 DETERMINE PILOTS' ROLE AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS (CAS).
Objective
Current CAS developments4 ' 5 focus on feasibility of engineering
approaches and, while experimental cockpit displays have been developed
additional effort appears warranted to define the crew's role with particular
emphasis on the information content and format required to support this role.
Approach
1. Develop "man-in-the-loop" concepts for CAS in coordination with
current FAA, ATA, and NASA efforts. 6, 7, 8 Desirable features might
include:
(a) Alternative modes of operation as a function of such factors
as traffic, flight phase and altitude.
(b) Full or partial display of the state of automatic functions
(i.e., targets held, % suspect, caution sector).
(c) Coordination with other cockpit needs and ease of use, (i. e.,
false alerts, combining with R-Nav or ATC data link command
displays).
2. Devise alternative CAS display mechanizations and subject to com-
parative tests for effectiveness and preference.
3. Prepare recommendations/findings to include:
(a) Additional tests and evaluations;
(b) Recommended characteristics for CAS information presenta-
tion.
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A-3 ADVANCED DISPLAY CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
Objective
Current cockpit display concepts are considered inadequate for present
day operation, e. g., Willis ' 9 false hypothesis theory involving inadequate,
10
misinterpreted, or missing information; Beck's citation of load stress and
speed stress errors due to data saturation; and Harper's T call for better
information transfer to the crew concerning aircraft state. The need for
advanced concepts of information presentation will become more urgent as
the pilot's role evolves into one of an off-line, monitor/optional operator.
Approach
1. Identify candidate presentation concepts 12, 13 in terms of:
(a) Functional areas (communication, flight safety, and flight
management).
(b) Types of information needed (e. g., projection, rate, options,
states).
(c) Formats and modes (e.g., graphic, command, audio, visual).
(d) Mechanization concepts (e. g., computer-assisted, passive
monitor with call up capability, multi-mode CRT).
2. Design experimentation to determine feasibility from the pilot/
operator point of view. Plans should include presentation hypotheses,
measures of effectiveness, and apparatus requirements for significantly
14different aircraft types (e. g., VTOL, SST).
3. Conduct experimentation and data analysis. Prepare recommen-
dations to include:
(a) Instrumentation principles;
(b) Crew roles and constitution; and,
(c) Required research.
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A-4 DETERMINE THE IN-COCKPIT REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH
ATC DATA LINK CONCEPTS FOR THE 1980's
Objectives
The Alexander report on ATC problems and needs envisions an evolu-
tionary system beginning with an upgraded version of the current National
Airspace System to serve through the 1980's. Central to the upgraded
system is a data link 1 5 capability providing at least one way command/con-
trol from a ground-based computer to the airborne element. The cockpit
configuration to accommodate these input commands (i.e., spacing, sequenc-
ing, conflict detection and resolution) requires development and test against
human factors standards and requirements.
Approach
1. Establish the requirements for information exchange between
ground and airborne elements under different ATC concepts (for example,
see Thomas1 6 and Schriever17). Specific concept differences should include
variations attributable to airborne vs. ground control.
2. Devise data link information presentation concepts with due con-
sideration to interacting and supporting techniques (station-keeping, R-NAV,
Flight Director, back-up equipment) for each of the allocation concepts of
(1) above.
3. Prepare experimental plan to exercise and evaluate these cockpit
presentation concepts. Plan should include:
(a) basic simulator;
(b) display apparatus; and,
(c) experimental design.
4. Conduct experiments and prepare data link content and format
recommendations for use in the following areas:
(a) Communication system.
(b) Cockpit instrumentation.
(c) Crew requirements under normal and degraded system
conditions.
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A-5 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER INFORMATION PROCESSING
Objective
Projected traffic volumes and the resulting controller workloads
are causing major reassessment of the controllers' role in processing
aircraft. Changes under consideration involve reassignment of certain
functions to the airborne element1 8 coordinated with a change in the con-
trollers' method of operation from direct control to management by excep-
tion. This research program will use the new set of ground functions as
a basis for developing and validating information requirements for the
various controller positions which emerge from this reallocation.
Approach
(Note: The preliminary work for this research recommendation is
similar to its in-cockpit counterparts, see items A-1 and A-4).
1. On the basis of ATC concepts projected for the 1980s (e. g., nav-
igation and separation functions assigned to the airborne element, speed
class sequencing, data link, etc. ) establish information requirements for
various controller positions.
2. Devise prototype information formats and presentation means
and prepare experimental plan to determine the human and total system
performance fostered by these prototypes.
3. Conduct experimentation and interpret the data in terms of:
* information presentation recommendations
econtroller crew configuration
*operating procedures and criteria
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C.
B. CREW FACTORS
1. Determine Requirements and Techniques for
Crew Interaction With On-Board Computers
2. Human Factors Variables in Handling Quality
Assessment
3. Visual Factors in the Approach-Landing Process
4. Variability of Private Pilot Control Input
5. Human Factors Improvements for See-And-Be-
Seen Collision Avoidance
6. Research in Workload, Fatigue and Stress
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B-1 DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS AND TECHNIQUES FOR CREW
INTERACTION WITH ON-BOARD COMPUTERS
Objectives
A variety of computer-based cockpit systems are under development
or evaluation, i. e., Airborne Integrated Data System, Flight Management,
R-NAV, All Weather Landing System and Collision Avoidance. Some
research activity1 9 has addressed the pilot-computer interface with the
crew acting as receptors of computer-generated commands, but more
effort20 is required to develop advanced concepts for two-way interaction
with the crew interrogating for such information as system status, pro-
jection data, or clerical computations.
Approach
1. Review pilot information requirements studies for advanced air-
craft for the purpose of determining those flight segments and information
needs where on-board computers might be brought to bear.
2. Devise experiments and identify apparatus necessary to support
investigations of the areas identified in (1) above.
(a) Methods for simulating computer functions.
(b) Input/Output devices.
(c) Performance hypotheses and scenarios.
3. Procure apparatus and implement experiments; prepare recom-
mendations for:
(a) future experimentation;
(b) cockpit hardware principles; and,
(c) crew roles and procedures.
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B-2 HUMAN FACTORS VARIABLES IN HANDLING QUALITY ASSESSMENT
Objective
A significant amount of research2 1 ' 22 is being conducted to improve
the handling qualities of conventional and advanced aircraft. Much of this
research relies heavily on the evaluation of aircraft dynamics (simulated or
actual) by test pilots. However, too little is known about the variables2 2
which a pilot considers when formulating his assessment. Further, his
assessment comments are not usually consistent with engineering terminol-
ogy involved in control system design and test. To improve upon the com-
munication between designers and pilots it is necessary to isolate the factors
used by the pilot during this assessment and to gather data to establish the
roles and relative influence of each of these factors.
Approach
1. Develop an experimental set of human factors variables* (and ter-
minology) which appears to influence a pilot's assessment of handling
qualities. The intent2 1 ' 22 is to increase the type and number of variables
considered during a pilot's assessment of handling qualities and, where
possible, to establish relationships with engineering characteristics** of
flight control systems.
For example: control/display features, external visual cues,
motion, acceleration, and vibration.
** For example: force trimming, dynamic/static friction, and force
gradients.
2. Conduct a series of experiments to evaluate, modify, and validate
the experimental assessment structure.
3. Apply validated assessment techniques to man-rate experimental
control systems-cockpit configurations.
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B-3 VISUAL FACTORS IN THE APPROACH-LANDING PROCESS*
Objective
An annual review of air transport accident statistics reported by Flight
Safety Foundation (FSF)2 3 indicates that 5 of 7 landing accidents occurred at
night at airports without glide slope service. Ground and onboard landing
aids to combat this problem are not expected to be available for some years
and consequently a better understanding of the visual approach is required.
The research objective presented here seeks to extend recent simulator in-
vestigations of the night VFR approach and to begin work on visual problems
under IFR breakout conditions.
Approach
Two coordinated programs should be considered. The first would
depart from the results of recent simulator investigations of night VFR
24 25approaches and should be coordinated with pending work of DOT
Suggested areas of emphasis should include:
-isolation of circumstances which constitute a hazard
for night VFR approaches.
-principles for advanced instrumentation, procedures,
charts, and training.
The second 6 effort is a series of visual perception and decision-
making studies of the IFR breakout circumstance conducted under various
decision heights and aircraft offsets, cloud cover, terrain, and landing aid
configurations.
Conclusions to be drawn from such investigations should cover:
Crew role/procedures/criteria
Cockpit and ground aids required for normal, night and low
visibility landing systems.
See research recommendations A-1 and B-5 for related programs.
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B-4 VARIABILITY OF PRIVATE PILOT CONTROL INPUT
Objective
27Stall/spin accidents in private aviation continue to occur at a high rate2 7
indicating that the user pilots' behavior is not congruent 8 with the manu-
facturers' test programs or the FAA certification process. This research
is intended to reduce this discrepancy by defining the variability of control
inputs by private pilots so as to be useful to the designers of improved con-
trol systems.
Approach
1. Prepare a data gathering plan for the purpose of defining aircraft
. ,29
control "performance envelopes"2 9 for typical users. Scope of the experi-
mental plan should be defined in terms of concepts for measuring control
input, pilot populations, aircraft and flight control types, flight segments,
and flight conditions.
2. Implement data collection using ground simulators adapted to this
purpose; include inflight verification as necessary.
3. Prepare findings in terms of "performance envelopes" or safety
margins which are representative of normal-emergency conditions,
various levels of pilot experience and critical portions of the flight profile.
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B-5 HUMAN FACTORS IMPROVEMENTS FOR SEE-AND-BE-SEEN
COLLISION AVOIDANCE
Objective
Detailed reviews3 0 of recent mid-air collisions indicate that a sur-
prisingly large percentage occur in the landing pattern where workload is
highest and vigilance lowest. These factors combine with visibility prob-
lems to restrict the visual-cognitive capability required for effective use of
the see and be seen concept. The objective of this program is to identify
and demonstrate the feasibility of one or more human factors solution con-
cepts which are compatible with but beyond the scope of sensing devices such
as Proximity Warning Indicators and Collision Avoidance Systems.
Approach
1. Determine through survey and experimentation the degree to which
the see and be seen concept is comprised by non-awareness of the techniques3 1
32
and ineffectualness of properly applied techniques
2. Compare improvements proposed for see and be seen operations
(for example, see AOPA 3 3 recommendations) against:
(a) Results of (1) above, and
34(b) Newly identified collision characteristics
3. Conduct test and evaluation of most promising solutions.
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B-6 RESEARCH IN WORKLOAD, FATIGUE AND STRESS
Objective
Problems arising from this array of human factors considerations
include: increases in requests for early medical retirement traced to
boredom, emotional stress about proficiency and fatigue;3 5 indictment
36
of emotional stress as accident cause; and, inhibited progress on ad-
vanced aircraft designs due to inadequate workload measurement tech-
37
niques and standards. The research recommended concerns selection
of measurement functions, development of instrumentation, and the col-
lection of data which can be translated into principles and standards.
Approach
Three specific study areas are recommended:
381. Desynchronosis.8 Conduct a controlled experiment to
quantify the symptoms of desynchronosis as a lead to pre-
cautionary and remedial measures research. Experiment
should be characterized by:
* pre-, post- and in-flight subject assessment,
• comparison of severe and mild time zone changes,
* basic medical parameter coverage.
392. Workload. 39 Gather experimental data on psycho-
physiological measures alone and in combination with
subsidiary task measures and subjective opinion to deter-
mine their utility as an index of pilot workload.
403. Physical Stress. 40 Conduct simulator studies to deter-
mine threshold sensitivity to angular accelerations typical
of advanced jet transport and attempt to define the visual-
vestibular interactions which may be the cause of disorien-
tation in airline pilots.
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C. TRAINING
1. Development of Human Factors Techniques
to Improve the Efficiency of Simulator
Employment
2. Training Benefits of Motion and Visual
Capabilities in Simulators
3. Demonstrate Training Techniques for
Cognitive Performance
4. Training Requirements Guidelines
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C-1 DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN FACTORS TECHNIQUES TO IMPROVE
THE EFFICIENCY OF SIMULATOR EMPLOYMENT
Obj ective
Increased reliance on simulator usage has been responsible for signi-
ficant reductions in the time required to qualify pilots in transition and up-
41grade training . Despite these advancements, it has been estimated that
42
simulator usage is only 50% as efficient as it could be . The purpose of
this research is to investigate advanced human factors methods of simulator
utilization which offer promise of further increasing the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the training process.
Approach
1. Employ recent research advances to develop new training concepts
which utilize the simulator as the nucleus. Illustrative content of the total
concepts might include:
43(a) Proficiency indications via onboard monitoring equipment4 3 .
(b) Private practice, automatic data generation, and self-con-
44frontation 44.
(c) Adaptive training with instructor diagnosis of preprocessed
45data
2. Design experimental settings and apparatus modifications to be
used in demonstrating the feasibility and benefits of the results of (1) above.
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C-2 TRAINING BENEFITS OF MOTION AND VISUAL CAPABILITIES IN
SIMULATORS
Objective
Data is readily available which purport to show the training advantages
46
of motion or visual capability in simulators 6 . However, the "full cycle"
has not always been investigated, i. e., more accurate tracking in motion
simulators does not necessarily equate with superior training. This research
program is intended to develop training benefit hypotheses for simulator ad-
vancements (primarily motion and visual attachments) and to conduct experi-
mentation4 7 to bear out or invalidate the contentions.
Approach
1. Review simulator/training advances as a basis for the development
of hypotheses and the preparation of experimental concepts/plans.
2. Using modified simulators gather data on the degree to which
simulator advances can benefit training. Identify the problems which the new
capabilities bring to the training arena
3. Interpret data to determine:
(a) need for additional research; and,
(b) principles for applying motion and visual simulators in
training programs.
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C-3 DEMONSTRATE TRAINING TECHNIQUES FOR COGNITIVE
PERFORMANCE
Objective
A training problem consistently reported by many researchers4 9 con-
cerns the lack of objective criterion measures to assess complex performance
especially in the higher level cognitive tasks. In addition to the assessment
problem many of these cognitive performances (vigilance, decision making,
judgement) are not included in current training curricula. This lack of
coverage is all the more disconcerting in view of the suspicion that these
types of performance are frequently involved in pilot error accidents. This
research area is intended to examine these types of performance for the
purpose of associating them with potential training techniques and to conduct
feasibility demonstrations where warranted.
Approach
1. Based on accident data and a review of flight crew performances,
identify cognitive tasks and behavioral traits which should receive treatment
but are not now covered in standard training curricula. Examples5 0 of such
performance are: vigilance or state of awareness, reactive capacity, con-
sistency of performance, adaptability and accuracy of expectancies.
2. Review the potential of existing training methods and performance
criteria to address the requirements of (1) above.
3. Conduct feasibility demonstrations where existing techniques
permit and recommend training research where voids are found.
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C-4 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS GUIDELINES
Objective
A major and continuing problem5 1 of training specialists is the deter-
mination of what should be taught and to what level of understanding. Total
reliance on the traditional task analysis is too theoretical and time consum-
ing. The training specialist needs guidelines to aid in selecting the tasks to
be trained, the quality of performance sought, and the conditions under which
the crew should be able to perform at this level. Observational studies5 2 ' 53
of inflight performance of crews are recommended to collect the data which
will serve as the basis for developing these guidelines.
Approach
1. In close coordination with ATA and ALPA representatives, design
the observational study program referenced above. Minimum scope of the
data plan should include:
(a) performance areas of interest and conditions of accom-
plishment,
(b) statistical requirements,
(c) personnel variables (e. g., experience, proficiency, age).
2. Implement data collection plan including pretest, modification and
data collection phases.
3. Analyze data to define principles for establishing training require-
ments covering such areas as:
(a) Skills most susceptible to error under normal conditions.
(b) Skills/performances most susceptible to deterioration
through disuse.
(c) Signs of performance deterioration by performance type.
(d) Performances most susceptible to load or speed stress.
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D. PSYCHOLOGICAL - PHYSIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
1. Passenger/Crew Protection Against Impact Injury
2. Human Response to Aircraft Noise and Sonic Boom
3. User Needs in Air Travel
9?
36
D-1 PASSENGER/CREW PROTECTION AGAINST IMPACT INJURY
Objective
A study of 153 U. S. air carrier accidents in years 1955-1964 concluded
that 1628 occupants died from impact forces, 297 died from fire, and 30 from
miscellaneous causes5 4 "The rate at which (air carrier) accidents lead to
fatalities is increasing. For the years 1961-1964, the number of fatal acci-
dents per million landings was 0. 27, 0. 88, 1. 06, and 1. 27 respectively. ",55
The objective of this research program is to develop and demonstrate impact
protection means as the heart of an integrated crash survival system, i. e.
including delethalization, evacuation factors and toxicity considerations.
Approach5 6
1. Develop and validate a mathematical model of the dynamic response
of the human vertebral column to impact forces in the magnitude and direc-
tions represented by new aircraft types.
2. Validate and exercise the model to provide data for the complete
design of crew and passenger seat support and restraint systems.
3. Devise total protection concepts based on impact protection means
of (1) and (2) above; determine through study and experimental investigations
the survivability improvements expected.
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D-2 HUMAN RESPONSE TO AIRCRAFT NOISE AND SONIC BOOM
Objective
Negative public reaction to noise and sonic boom are potential deter-
rents to new transport modes such as VTOL and attempts to reduce the
negative reaction has aggrevated congestion (90 movements per hour at
JFK with noise abatement vs. 150 movements per hour at O'Hare without
noise abatement 5 7 ) and created concern over safety. The purpose of this
research program is to determine the psychological-acoustical impacts of
aircraft noise and sonic boom on flight crew and community. The intent
is to provide data to authorities for use in establishing guidelines and stan-
dards.
Approach
Continue5 8 to gather data to develop an information base having appli-
cations: to the establishment of international noise standards, to future
aircraft/airport operations, and to the evaluation of aircraft noise reduction
approaches. Specific study coverage should include subjective noise com-
parison tests, absolute judgment tests, sleep interference tests, auditory
and non-auditory tests, task performance tests, and acoustic-vibration tests.
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D-3 USER NEEDS IN AIR TRAVEL
Objective
User dissatisfaction with air travel is represented by such diverse
areas as uncomfortable ride qualities contributing to non-acceptance of some
vehicles5 9 passenger congestion and ground processing difficulties with their
60potential back-up into the ATC system6 0 and the users' impression of air
safety and its impact on the selection of mode of travel6 1 The objective of
this research area is to develop techniques and data which will improve the
degree to which users' needs are met in new transport technology.
Approach
Develop and test analytical trade-off techniques involving the following
areas:
.user acceptance factors (vibration, space, noise, perceived
safety, enroute time)
-engineering variables (wing loading, angle and speed of
approach, handling characteristics)
.employment concepts (satellite airport, load factor,
cabin capacity).
The development and test process should include:
*studies to define factors and theoretical relationships
(ride quality and angle/speed of attack)
-a series of data gathering efforts to quantify the factors
and validate the relationships.
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E. SUPPORTING RESEARCH
1. Develop Human Factors Data Collection
Techniques Appropriate For Inclusion in
the Accident/Incident Investigation Process
2.. Data For Support of Man-Machine Allocations
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E-1 DEVELOP HUMAN FACTORS DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES
APPROPRIATE FOR INCLUSION IN THE ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
INVESTIGATION PROCESS
Objective
Historical accident data reveal an extremely high percentage of pilot
62error accidents (51% primary causes and 28% secondary causes 62). Yet the
accident investigative data being accumulated do not seem to provide the re-
searcher with the basis for preventive or corrective programs, i. e., an
extensive review6 3 of landing accident data was unable to isolate causes and
suggests a massive data collection program to overcome this void. Develop-
ment of suitable techniques to accumulate and analyze such data is the objec-
tive of this research program.
Approach
1. Define scope of the problem to include at least the following areas
of concern:
(a) Human factors information desired and techniques applicable
to its collection during investigation of accidents/incidents6 4 .
(b) Screening and analysis of data from new sources such as
onboard6 5 monitoring systems and training data pools.
(c) Data exchange capability6 6 emphasizing human factors
aspects of operation, training, and design.
2. Conduct feasibility efforts for each of these areas of concern
working with relevant agencies and organizations such as:
NTSB
ALPA
NSF (Information Exchange)
ATA
3. Evaluate results of feasibility studies and recommend changes,
discontinuance or implementation plans.
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E-2 DATA FOR SUPPORT OF MAN-MACHINE ALLOCATIONS
Objective
Many of the aviation research programs being conducted involve an
allocation of system functions between air and ground elements or between
67
men and machines. A recent study67 provided a brief history of the tech-
nical inadequacies of this allocation process and outlined the actions neces-
sary to eliminate many of the resulting problems. This research program
is intended to implement the outlined actions as a means of providing design
and certification agencies with the appropriate principles and standards.
Approach
1. Develop a methodology for conducting man-machine allocations
and establishing roles, size and operating procedures for the crew.
2. In coordination with related military efforts6 8 , develop the data
base on manls capabilities and limitations required to support the alloca-
tion methodology; this development must include formats and retrieval con-
cepts for the elements of the data base.
3. Conduct a proof-of-concept effort on a specific, future vehicle
such as the VTOL aircraft.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF PROBLEM LISTING
INTRODUCTION
Unstructured interviews were held first with non-NASA and then with
NASA technical personnel for the purpose of developing a listing of human
factors problems in civil aviation. A preliminary listing of candidate prob-
lems, obtained from the literature, was furnished to the interviewees to
serve as a guide and stimulus. Interviewees were asked to comment (pro-/
con-amplifications) ononly those problems for which they felt they had
reasonable technical knowledge. Specific effort was made to have the inter-
viewees add problems to the list either directly (e.g., human factors prob-
lems they felt should be on the list but were not) or indirectly by indicating
new aeronautical technology or aviation problems with human factors over-
tones.
Two additional types of problem information were obtained. Question-
naires were distributed to each member of a NASA coordinating committee,
and open-ended requests were mailed to 100 people soliciting their opinion
on the top "several" human factors problems. The address list for the
mailing was compiled largely from the Human lactors Society membership
directory and included only those people whose areas of stated interest
covered both human factors and aviation.
As the problems were being identified, it became clear that a categor-
ization would facilitate the interviews and generally aid in keeping track of
collected information. The following categories evolved during the problem
development process:
I Crew-Aircraft
II Air Traffic Control
III Aviation-Community Interface
IV Medical/Psychological
V Selection and Training
VI Maintenance
A-3
VII . Crash Survivability
VIII Miscellaneous
The list of problems resulting from the process described above is
presented on the following pages. The check marks indicated those prob-
lems added to the list relatively late in the development process.
It should be noted that the list as it appears here was used primarily
as an interview aid, and therefore some of the "problems" suggest research
recommendations (e. g., Need for Measurement Techniques and Standards
for Pilot Workload); some are techniques which if not properly applied will
result in problems (e. g. , Allocation of Functions); and there is much over-
lap (e. g., Approach and Landing Accidents and Cockpit Instrumentation).
These inconsistencies were deliberately allowed to remain in order to
elicit the broadest range of comments possible from each of the diverse
elements of the-interview population.
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LIST OF HUMAN FACTORS
PROBLEM AREAS IN AVIATION
Category I. Crew-Aircraft
1. Allocation of functions between crew members, man
and machine, air and ground.
2. Measurement and standards for aircraft handling
characteristics.
3. Structural overload deriving from pilot reaction to
low frequency turbulence.
4. Physical characteristics of airports as they relate to
piloting activities.
5. Aircraft control systems compatible with natural
pilot response.
6. Need for improved stability and control augmentation
systems.
7. Lack of measurement techniques and standards for
pilot workload.
8. Presentation of enroute and terminal information.
i
9. Principles for pilot assist devices applicable to flight
control, approach and landing, and flight management.
10. Aircraft standardization in the crew and passenger
compartments, and for maintenance.
11. Excessive requirements for voice communication.
12. Inadequate employment of human factors principles
in the design of aviation systems.
13. Acceptable methods and standards for determining
crew size.
14. Proliferation of cockpit displays.
15. Faulty cockpit layout as an accident factor.
16. Pilot errors induced by aircraft design.
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As
17. Visual collision avoidance.
18. The approach and landing phase of flight.
19. Cockpit noise.
20. Exceeding aircraft design limits by pilots.
21. The factor of weather in aviation accidents.
22. Instrument panel vibration.
23. Questionable safety of noise abatement pro-
cedures.
24. Obstruction marking.
25. Human factors involvement in aircraft certification.
26. Pilot warning indicators.
27. Aircraft lighting and marking.
*28. Inadequacies of current cockpit instruments.
*29. Task and aircraft design simplicity.
*30. Need to reconsider aircraft controls.
*31. Stall-spin accidents.
*32. Private pilot limitations in dealing with airspace
congestion.
*33. Judgment and poor airmanship as an accident cause.
*34. Terminal area visibility requirements.
*35. Lack of standardized procedures or non-adherence
to standard procedures.
*36. Desirability of automating checklist.
*37. Efficacy of direct lift controls.
*38. Collation and compensation of "faulty" information
from cockpit displays.
* Asterisked items are problems which were added to the list relatively
late in the development process.
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*39. Performance decrement from mechanical or
environmental factors, e.g., vibration, noise,
acceleration.
Category II. Air Traffic Control
1. Excessive air traffic controller workload.
2. Definition of air traffic controller assist devices.
3. Allocation of ATC functions between air and ground,
man and machine, and amongst positions.
4. Ground control of aircraft.
5. Controller training.
6. Controller proficiency.
7. Lack of human factors principles in design of ATC
workspace.
* 8. Determination of information requirements and
instrumentation.
* 9. Capacity of ATC as a function of personnel factors.
Category III. Aviation-Community Interface,
1. Adequacy of number of qualified pilots.
2. Adequacy of number of qualified controllers.
3. Adequacy of number of qualified aviation support
personnel.
4. Intermodal transportation problems.
5. Sonic boom effects on people.
6. Aviation noise.
7. The basis for public choice of transportation mode.
8. Means for quantifying the benefits of human factors
program.
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9. Bomb threats, aircraft hijacking, and sabotage.
10. Congestion problems for processing and loading
passengers.
11. Aviation-caused air pollution.
12. International flight complexities, e.g., language,
antiquated facilities.
13. Passenger comfort and convenience.
*14. Necessity to emphasize social factors in air transport
development.
Category IV. Medical/Psychological
1. Circadian rhythm.
2. Early detection of disease in aviation personnel.
3. Prediction and detection of solar flares.
4. Anoxia.
5. Explosive decompression.
6. Ageing.
7. Fatigue and effect on performance.
8. Emotional stress.
9. Vibration-induced back injuries.
10. Hearing impairments attributable to aviation
noise.
11. In-aircraft medical care.
12. Sanitation onboard aircraft.
13. Updating of physical requirements for pilots.
14. A readiness self-test.
15. Attentiveness and its variations in different parts
of the flight profile.
16. Visual illusions.
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17. Rapid transition from light to dark in SST profiles.
18. Need for display of anticipatory information, e. g.,
imminent events for automatic systems.
19. Effect of off-duty activities on performance.
20. Turbulence-induced visual deterioration.
21. Negative reaction of pilots to assist devices such
as automatic gear extenders.
22. Negative reaction of air traffic controllers to assist
devices.
23. Controller morale.
24. Attitude of the general aviation pilot (non-professional)
to weather.
25. Mass behavior under emergency crash conditions.
26. Complacency of aircrews.
27. Controller-pilot relationship.
28. Vertigo/disorientation.
*29. Cockpit-derived health problems.
*30. Cigarette smoking, anoxia and "veiling".
i
*31. Ego involvement in accidents.
*32. General health habits.
*33. Crew interchangeability and emergency effectiveness.
*34. Difficulty of obtaining rest before and during (extended)
trips.
*35. "Get-out-itus" for senior pilots.
Category V. Selection and Training
1. Private pilot certification requirements.
2. Pilot proficiency and procedural knowledge.
3. Use of simulators in training and check-outs.
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4. Selection and training techniques and standards.
5. Measures of effectiveness for air safety educa-
tional programs.
6. Ground classroom training improvements.
7. Feedback of accident information.
8. General aviation aircraft manuals.
* 9. Poor weather instructional techniques.
*10. Required simulator advancements.
*11. Controller selection criteria.
12. Human factors benefits of variable stability
aircraft.
*13. Need to quantify human performance criteria.
*14. Realism in simulation scenarios.
*15. Hazards of training role reversals (in flight).
*16. Lack of understanding of differences between
research and training simulators.
Category VI. Maintenance
1. New techniques to foster maintenance technician
performance (e. g., training methods, job aids).
2. Accidents attributable to maintenance error.
Category VII. Crash Survivability
1. Crashworthiness.
2. Restraint.
3. Injurious environment.
4. Energy absorption.
5. Post crash behavior.
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* 6. Trade-off criteria for evacuation versus aerodynamic
factors.
* 7. Toxicity.
Category VIII. Miscellaneous
1. Semantics.
2. Compatibility of regulations with user needs.
3. Communication of information to users.
4. Protection of private pilot from self without
excessive restrictions.
5. The need for better (human factors) aviation
statistics.
* 6. Validity of research settings and results.
* 7. Alcohol and flathatting.
* 8. Lack of measures to establish quality of man-
machine combination.
* 9. Expense of avionics as a deterrent to light air-
craft operators.
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II. RANKING DATA AND PROBLEM DISPOSITION
INTRODUCTION
During the development of the aviation problem listing information
was sought to support a "frequency-of-mention" ranking of the candidate
problems. The purpose was not to obtain a precise numerical ranking
for each problem; rather, the intention was to distinguish between the most
and least severe problems on the basis of expert opinion. The following
six sources of information were used for this application:
1. Approximately 600 articles from trade-journal literature.
2. Technical reports (approximately 175) resulting from two
literature search requests of the Defense Documentation
Center.
3. Information resulting from the interviews of non-NASA
technical personnel (16 individuals).
4. Information resulting from the interviews of NASA tech-
nical personnel (35 individuals).
5. Responses to an open-ended request for human factors
problems (20 responses from 100 mailings).
6. Questionnaire data obtained from NASA coordinating com-
mittee members plus project principals.
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RANKING TECHNIQUE
These sources of information were used in the following fashion to
select the aviation problems which warranted research attention. The
interviewees were asked to comment within their technical field on the
candidate problems which they felt to be most pressing. The results of
these interviews (i. e., frequency of mention) were compiled for NASA,
for non-NASA (including the mailing) and for the trade-journal literature.
Figures A-1, A-2 and A-3 present the resulting distributions of problem
mentions. *
The NASA and non-NASA "votes" were added and the top one third
of the problems was selected tentatively. These problems were then
compared against the literature distribution. Problems for which both
groups (interviewees and literature) were in agreement were retained for
inclusion on the list. The remainder of the problems were treated in one
of the following ways.
1. A low vote problem could be absorbed by a high vote prob-
lem precluding elimination.
2. A problem could be retained despite a low vote if a case
could be developed to show impact on safety, cost or effect-
iveness.
3. If neither of these options was possible the problem was
eliminated from the final listing.
No attempt was made to interpret similarities or discrepancies.
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Table A-1 summarizes the voting data and the disposition of prob-
lems. Columns 2 and 3 present the numbers of interviewed persons or
groups who chose to comment on each problem. Columns 4 and 5 show
whether this frequency of mention was sufficient for placement in the top
one third of the problems. Columns 6 through 9 indicate disposition of each
problem according to the following legend:
Column 6 -
Column 7 -
check indicates that problem was
included in the final listing on the
basis of commentary, i. e., NASA,
non-NASA and literature.
entry indicates that the problem of
column 1 was absorbed by the indicated
problem.
Column 8 - entry indicates that problem was retained
on basis of:
S = Safety, C = Cost or E = Effectiveness.
Column 9 - check indicates that problem was elim-
inated.
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III. DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SELECTED PROBLEMS
The thirty-eight problems selected as most worthy of research
attention are described briefly in this chapter to include:
1. Statement of scope;
2. Cost, safety and effectiveness considerations; and,
3. Ranking by NASA, non-NASA and literature sources.
A list of references to support these descriptions appears at the
end of this section.
1. Air Traffic Controller Workload (II-1)
The capacity of air traffic control systems is a function of personnel
factors such as number, specialties, organization, and operating policy
(see Figure A-4). Current man-machine configurations (now in the pro-
cess of installation) will not handle the predicted traffic volumes (140
million in the near future) without radical decentralization of functions
from the ground to the airborne elements and the provision of controller
assist techniques (see Table A-2).
Effectiveness Current congestion problems are attributed in
part to a shortage of controllers and increasing
traffic volumes. These factors combine to impose
a severe workload on the controller staff and the
condition is expected to worsen in the near future.
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
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- Theoretically determined
capacity (APS #5)*
- Actual capacity derived
from available literature**
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2
*Maximum capability curves = 20x + 20x + 40 where x = number
of journeymen controllers.
** These values illustrate only a general relationship and should not
be taken as findings.
FIGURE A-4 COMPARATIVE RELATIONSHIP OF TEAM SIZE AND
AIRCRAFT HANDLING CAPACITY FROM THEORETICAL AND ACNUAL
DETERMINATIONS DERIVED FROM CURRENT LITERATURE
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TABLE A-2 INCREASING AIRPORT CAPACITY*
Runway
Configuration 2 60 20 60 20 60 20
One @ 3500 ft. 33 38 34 40 36 42 39 45
Two @ 3500 ft. 67 69 69 72 81 84 96 99
Three @ 5000 ft 77 86 80 89 85 94 89 101
Six @ 5000 ft 133 137 139 144 103 168 173 193(2 skew) I
* IFR aircraft handled per hour, assuming a 4-min
(average) delay for arrivals or departures, which-
ever occurs first. Maximum capacities are about
20 percent higher than the values shown.
A key technique in comparing alternatives to air terminal
improvements is summarized in this table of tradeoffs be-
tween concrete runways and auotmated traffic control
procedures. Present hourly IFR capacities for four runway
configurations are shown in the first column for two dif-
ferent mixes of aircraft. Two 3500-ft. parallel runways
handle about twice the traffic of a single 3500-ft. runway,
but the increase in capacity enjoyed by traffic going to
three parallel 5000-ft. runways is not nearly proportional
to the added concrete. Total capacity, in fact, is less than
that of the two 3500-ft. runways equipped with CAAS and
SCS; the payoff here is in automation, not concrete. The
reason for this anomaly and others in the table is that
the approach airspaces for parallel runways overlap and
the traffic controllers must then manually sequence the
traffic. Some gains for concrete, however, are achieved
by placing the third runway skew to the parallel pair.
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SCS Plus
Present Speed-Class Computer- CAAS & SCS
ATC Sequencing Aided With 60-eSec
Scheduling (SCS) Approach MaximumScheduling | (SCS) Spacing(CAAS) Separation
Long Haul Jets In Mix (Percent)
I I I I . I
2. Approach and Landing (I-18)
As in the case of at least two other problems (allocation of
functions/air and human factors principles and data) the approach/
landing problem permeates many of the other problems. Recommenda-
tions to eliminate this problem because its difficulties were covered in
other problems were resisted for two major reasons. First, the "high
stress" aspects of the approach and landing tend to flush out problems
which are not so apparent in-the milder environments. Therefore, its
retention on the list is intended to emphasize its potential for identifying
researchable issues. Second, a large research payoff is represented by
this phase and giving it visibility is intended to encourage its use as a
research setting and as a guage for measuring research and development
results.
Safety The landing and approach phase accounts for about
1/2 of the air carrier accidents (see Figure A-5) and
the rate at which these accidents lead to fatalities is
increasing. For the years 1961 - 1964 the number
of fatal accidents per million landings was 0. 27,
0.88, 1.06, and 1.27 respectively. 4
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
3. Collision Avoidance (I-17)
The 586 fatalities in 225 mid-air collisions over a 12-year
period (see Table A-3) are a measure of this problem's severity and by all
accounts it will get worse. The human factors aspects of this problem, on
the one hand, derive from the fact that a large proportion of the collisions
occur under see-and-be-seen conditions implicating attentiveness and cock-
pit visibility to name just two areas. On the other hand, engineering solu-
tions are under development (Proximity Warning Indicators and Collision
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The unit of transport productivity (passenger-miles), a
valid yardstick for measuring economic growth or profit-
ability, is not valid for measuring safety because not every
mile of a flight is equally safe. FAA data on accidents
involving commercial carrier aircraft during 1966 show
that the cruise regime, in which largest numbers of seat-
miles or passenger-miles are clocked up, is generally safer
than taxiing, takeoff, and climb; and that the takeoff-
climb regime is safer than taxiiing, takeoff, and climb; and
that the takeoff-climb regime is safer than descent, ap-
proach, and landing. Since every flight, irrespective of its
length or the number of passengers carried, goes through
each phase from taxiing out through taxiing back in, numbers
of trips (or flights, or flight-segments, or departures)
would appear to be a sounder base for statistical evalua-
tion. Further, casualties per unit of transport productivity
is a meaningless figure to people, who measure their lives
in units of time, or in events. An airline may consider a
passenger in terms of ton-miles or passenger-miles; but
he thinks of his trip as an event, either a singular inci-
dent or as a number of elapsed hours. (Source: FAA)
·FIGURE A-5 CARRIER AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS(1966)
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TABLE A-3 MIDAIR COLLISIONS - U.S. CIVIL AVIATIONa
~Ac~cidents jAccidents by Aviation-ClassA ccidents ....
_Fatal Cri/ ar rier / Carrier / Carrier General/ General/
Total Fatal ities Carrier General Military Military General
1956 17 11 161 1 0 1 14
1957 15 6 19 0 0 1 4 10
1958 16 12 86 0 0 2 2 12
1959 13 10 20 0 0 0 3 10
1960 26 10 152 1 4 0 2 19
1961 20 10 22 0 0 0 0 20
1962 19 9 27 0 0 0 5 14
1963 13 3 6 0 0 0 2 11
1964 15 7 12 0 0 0 2 13
1965 47 14 30 1 0 0 2 44
1966 24 9 51 0 1 0 3 20
1967 NA NA NA 0 2 1 NA 27
Total 225 101 586 3 6 3 26 187
aNTSB & FAA. b1967 not included.
General aviation aircraft crash into'each other in the air with
astonishing frequency; they also hit carrier and military air-
craft more often than seems statistically probable.
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Avoidance Systems) which have some major and minor human factors
problems themselves, e. g., information presentation, acceptance of
automatic evasive maneuvers and compatibility with man's limited
visual capabilities.
Safety General aviation is involved in more mid-air col-
lisions than seems statistically probable; while
collisions are relatively infrequent their fatality
toll is high.
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
4. Cockpit Instrumentation (1-28)
Three examples of the need for improving cockpit information
presentation are: 1) Willis' false hypothesis theory involving inadequate,
misinterpreted or missing information; 2) Beck's citation of load stress
and speed stress errors due to data saturation; and 3) Harper's call for
better information transfer to the crew concerning aircraft state. The
inadequate state of current instrumentation is widely recognized but
specific recommendations for improvement are either not being generated,
or are experiencing difficulty in dislodging the existing techniques, e. g., taped
instruments, head-up display, flight directors, etc.
Safety False Hypothesis - "Probably more common than is
realized; may be the cause of a substantial number of
inadequately explained accidents; involves erroneous
estimation of glide path, etc.; based on inadequate or
misinterpreted information, compounded by the absence
of 'corrective' information.6
A-33
"With present day instrumentation and workloads,
flight crews may well be approaching a point of
'data saturation' which will result in a deterior-
ation of performance leading to errors through
'speed stress' or 'load stress. "'
Effectiveness Information transfer must be improved if the full
advantage of certain current (e. g., all-weather
helicopter) and many advanced designs (VTOL,
SST) can be realized. 8 Cockpit instrumentation
improvements demanded by users but mutually
acceptable concepts do not seem available.
RANKING:
NASA
Top 1/3
NON-NASA
Top 1/3
LITERATURE
Top 1/3
5. Handling Characteristics (I-2)
The human factors involvement in the problem annotations
listed is an inadequate understanding of the variables (cues/senses)
used in assessing flight characteristics.
Safety Poor handling characteristics of some general
aviation aircraft, especially in the stall region;1 0
suggestion of handling characteristics as a factor
behind the increase in jet transport landing acci-
dents. 11
Effectiveness Apparent conflict between the aerodynamic need for
stability and control augmentation systems on
advanced aircraft and pilot's desire to minimize
their usage 12, 13their usage.
RANKING:
NASA
Top 1/3
NON-NASA
Mid 1/3
LITERATURE
Mid 1/3
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6. Allocation of Functions (I-1)
This problem relates to the technique for generating alter-
native sets of man-machine responsibilities; experimentation to identify
the optimum set; translating the results into crew size and procedures;
and providing inputs to subsequent functions such as training and instru-
mentation.
Safety Apparent link between crew size, crew coordination and
14
approach/landing accidents; compatibility between
man's capabilities and his role in automatic all-weather
landing systems in particular and "automatics" in gen-
15
eral.
Cost A major factor in crew size disputes is cost, especially
for the supplemental carrier using short haul jets where
crew costs average about 40-45 percent of total. 16
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
7. Passenger Comfort and Convenience (III-13)
The problem has two parts: in-flight conditions (riding
qualities) and ground activities. The former is quite obvious and is
highly related to problem 1-3 - Turbulence, but from the passenger's
view rather than safety of flight. The ground activities phase is threat-
ening to overwhelm even the air traffic control system and is concerned
with loading and processing passengers and intermodal/nodal consider-
ations: ". . . intersections of human and vehicular traffic, both of which
must be guided and controlled -- the first by psychology, sociology and
information technology, the second by the engineering of the inter-
relations among devices." 17
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Effectivene s s Passenger congestion at terminals, loading points,
and nodes may back up into ATC system;1 8 riding
quality of some current (Helo) and projected (VTOL)
aircraft is suspect. 19aircraft is suspect.
RANKING:
NASA
Top 1/3
NON-NASA
Bottom 1/3
LIT ERA TU RE
Top 1/3
8. Pilot Assist Devices (I-9)
During system development, allocation of functions and the
development of pilot assist devices are conducted in an integrated fashion
and it might seem natural to combine these two problems. The reason
behind keeping them separate in this list is to distinguish the methodol-
ogical need of the allocation problem from the "proof of concept" need
regarding pilot assist devices.
Safety "A ircraft are getting to the point where pilot skill
alone is not enough to control them during landings
,,20particularly in bad weather; light aircraft
accidents/incidents could be reduced by availability
of safety assist devices, e. g., roll stability for
inadvertent weath21, 22inadvertent weather entry.
Effectiveness Without inclusion of acceptable man-in-the-loop fea-
tures (e. g., input/output facility for onboard computer,
inclusion of operability information, etc. ) resistance to
automatic systems will continue. 23
9. Compatibility of Regulations with User Needs (VIII-2)
The most popular issues of this problem derived from conges-
tion and the regulatory attempts to ease the situation. Other aspects
included training requirements (both private and air carrier), technical
A-36
data disclosure (test and accident) and certification requirements (pri-
vate only). The common denominator for all these aspects is a lack of
statistics or technical data to support or invalidate one regulatory action
over another (i. e., aircraft noise, private pilot certification and pro-
ficiency measures, crew size in 737, simulator efficacy, etc. ).
Effectiveness Concern is for the basis, fairness and understandabil-
ity of regulatory attempts to control airspace usage,
training requirements and technical data disclosures.
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Bottom 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
10. Enroute and Terminal Information (I-8)
The initial scope of this problem included only the clutter
and cumbersome handling of charts. It was expanded, however, to
include all non-aircraft information necessary to plan and conduct a
flight, e.g., weather, regulations/procedures, navigational and NOTAMS.
The major justifications for this problem are: 1) complexity of information
is moderate to high for even the professional pilot and the trend is toward
much more IFR flying on the part of the light aircraft pilots (it is esti-
mated that 70% of instrument approaches will be made by general avia-
tion in 1980); and 2) to capture the congestion, workload and communi-
cation benefits of R-NAV, a new network of airways and attendant oper-
ating criteria will be required beyond that of the already complex sys-
24tem.
Safety Distraction of chart handling was posed as an accident
factor in a jet transport crash. 25
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
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11. Crashworthiness (VII-1)
The areas included within this problem are concerned with
impact (delethalization and restraint), heat, smoke and toxicity pro-
tection, and evacuation standards.
Safety 153 U. S. air carrier accidents were caused by or
resulted in fire in years 1955-1964; the study of
these accidents concluded that 1628 occupants died
from impact forces, 297 died from fire, and 30
from miscellaneous causes. 26 "The rate at
which (air carrier) accidents lead to fatalities is
increasing. For the years 1961-1964, the number
of fatal accidents per million landings was 0. 27,
0. 88, 1. 06, and 1.27 respectively.27
12. Human Factors Design Principles/Data (I-12)
28
Studies have shown 8 and expert opinion support the find-
ings 29 that human factors design principles are not finding their way into
aviation systems. Causes have been theorized but activity toward veri-
fying cause, developing and validating corrective measures has not been
forthcoming. The specific problem concerns the validity and utility of
research results and the meaningfulness with which they are made avail-
able to the user populations.
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Mid 1/3 Bottom 1/3
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13. Aviation Weather (I-21)
In general aviation the underlying theme is lack of know-
ledge about and respect for the hazards of weather. The major weather
problem regarding air carrier operations concerns the crew's ability
to cope with: 1) the visual problems (approach light ambiguity, pattern
recognition, etc. ) upon breaking out in "ragged" IFR conditions, and
2) the concomitant team decision requirements.
Safety During 1965 . . . 250 (45%) of the 550 (general
aviation) accidents involving weather were directly
or indirectly caused by the pilot . ." (see Figure
A-6).
Effectiveness Terminal area visibility and breakout conditions
(approach light ambiguity and uncontrollability) are
not understood well enough to support all weather
landing operations (see Figure A-7).
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
14. Pilot Proficiency and Procedural Knowledge (V-2)
In the context of air carrier operations this problem addresses
the difficulty (imprecision) of assessing pilot proficiency. The impetus
in this case is detection of marginal cases with reasonable cost. For
general aviation (private pilots) the problem is oriented more to safety,
stressing the need to instill and maintain, in the pilot, an appropriate
level of capability.
Safety "The biggest single factor in the failure to reduce
the constantly increasing number of aircraft
accidents and fatalities in general aviation
A-39
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i
is attributed directly to the lack of pilot proficiency
and procedural knowledge . . . lack of pilot proficiency
and procedural knowledge was behind 80% of the more
than 5000 general aviation accidents last year" (see
Figure A-8); accident reviews showed that many pilot
error accidents (general aviation) were attributable to
"deterioration of basic airmanship and skills and the
pilot's failure to keep abreast of new developments and
procedures. ,,33
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
15. Performance Decrement and Environmental Factors (1-39)
The air carrier version of this problem relates to the long
term impact of cockpit environmental factors such as humidity, noise
and vibration, with emphasis on the effects of combinations of these
factors. In general aviation it is restricted to anoxia in high perform-
ance aircraft and the distraction of cockpit noise.
Effectiveness Some cockpits claimed to be the source of medical
problems, i.e., hearing impairment, vibration-
induced back injury, dehydration.
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Bottom 1/3 Top 1/3 Bottom 1/3
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Number of accidents per 100,000 Flight Hours
1955
1965
Cause Factor
CARELESSNESSFAULTY FLYi"G i ANAGEMENT
MISCELLANEOUS
60% 4.7% CAUSES 12.6%
22.7%
Phase of Flight
TAKEOFF MISCELLANEOUS OPERATION APPROACH LANDING
18% 31% 24% 27%
FIGURE A-8 GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENT RATES AND CAUSES3 2
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16. Standardization (I-10)
Standardization of maintenance features, cockpit instru-
mentation and passenger cabin interiors can result in reduced initial
aircraft cost and reduced operating costs via inter-line pooling arrange-
ments. The problem from the human factors standpoint is not to prove
that standardization is beneficial but rather to generate standard config-
urations which meet all user's needs.
Safety Standardize emergency features in passenger cabin
34
to foster familiarity; model differences cited
35
as contributing factor in jet crash.
Effectiveness Financial feasibility of advanced aircraft may depend
on standardization in cockpit, passenger cabin and on
maintainability features as a means of encouraging
36inter-line exchange agreements. 36
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Mid 1/3 Top 1/3 Mid 1/3
17. Non-adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (I-35)
This problem refers to errors of commission (shortcuts,
faulty technique, etc.) and omission occurring in both air carrier and
general aviation.
Safety Omitted flight procedures are a relatively frequent
37
occurrence in air carrier operations; 37 "one major
category of pilot error (landing) accidents: failure to carry
out established procedures (in many cases shortcuts
intended to ensure completing an approach . . . ). 38
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RANKING:
NASA
Top 1/3
NON-NASA
Bottom 1/3
LITERATURE
Bottom 1/3
18. Maintenance Effectiveness (111-3)
The original scope of this problem was narrowed from all
support personnel to include only maintenance technicians; it was then
extended to cover maintenance effectiveness and its implications to safety
39
of flight. This latter expansion was prompted by work of Willis,
and recent pronouncements by the National Transportation Safety Board. 40
Safety The maintenance factor may be 10 times that of pilot
error as a cause of accidents/incidents;4 1 "If the
current mechanic production trend for general avia-
tion continues, there will be 1/2 as many mechanics
per plane by 1975 - and safety in-flight is no better
than mechanical condition of the aircraft. ",42
Effectivene s s General aviation will need about 183, 500 mechanics
and air carriers will require about 95, 000 during the
1965-1980 time period. 4 3
RANKING:
NASA
Bottom 1/3
NON-NASA
Top 1/3
LITERATURE
Middle 1/3
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19. Hijackings and Sabotage (III-9)
The efforts to deal with this problem concern human factors
in two ways: 1) attempting to "profile" perpetrator for interdiction as
well as preparing crew to cope with such a person; and, 2) the impact
on the flying public of the threat and the attempts at cures, i.e., searches.
Safety Threat of hijackings to passenger safety; 13 bomb
destructs and many more hoaxes since 1933. 44
Cost Claims for sabotage accidents; $20, 000 estimate per
diversion due to bomb hoax. 4 5
Effectiveness Ill-will of traveling public because of personal search;
threatened IFALPA strike.
RANKING:
NASA
Bottom 1/3
NON-NASA
Top 1/3
LITERATURE
Mid 1/3
20. Required Simulator Improvements (V-10)
The predominant theme in the trade literature is achieve-
ment of specific improvements requested by simulator users, i. e., pri-
marily motion and visual attachment fidelity. Interview comments agree
in general but urge that proof of utility or pay-off be obtained to guard
against fidelity for fidelity's sake.
Effectiveness To support more realistic research settings and
handling qualities research, and to permit more
widespread usage of simulators, improvements are
needed in simulator technology; most notable needs
relate to vision and motion.4 6
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RANKING:
NASA
Top 1/3
NON-NASA
Top 1/3
LITERATURE
Top 1/3
21. Pilot Manpower Shortage (III-1)
The original problem concerned the "shortage" of pilots for
air carrier operations. In general aviation this seems to be somewhat
true of instructor pilots (i. e., insufficient number of check pilots to
administer a recent FAA proficiency plan) but at least in the air carrier
context it does not seem to be a pressing issue. However, there appears
to be an inability to predict the roles and qualifications of future flight
crews for use as a foundation for current recruitment, selection and
training practices.
Effectiveness Junior captains are purported to have the widest exper-
ience variability in the airline's history; early "medical"
retirements are increasing; airlines are contemplating
reaching into the junior ranks for their SST crews; and
younger crews seem more amenable to the "automatics"
appearing on the scene. 47appearing on the scene.
RANKING:
NASA
Bottom 1/3
NON-NASA
Bottom 1/3
LITERA T URE
Mid 1/3
22. Fatigue (IVT- 7)
The scope of this problem extends from the difficulty of ob-
taining rest before and during extended trips (see Figure A-9), to its
implication in pilot error accidents, to its being cited as a symptom for
boredom and a cause for medical/discharge/retirement.
This problem as described above was not evaluated by interviewees, but
emerged as a result of analyzing interview results.
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Estimated as being a factor in between 5% and 10% of
pilot error accidents.4 9pilot error accidents.
Effectiveness Increase in requests for early medical retirement
related to boredom as a cause and fatigue as the
symptom. 50
RANKING:
NASA
Mid 1/3
NON-NASA
Top 1/3
LITERATURE
Mid 1/3
23. Aircraft Noise (III-6)
This problem is similar to the sonic boom but was kept sepa-
rate on the basis of its technical uniqueness. The human factors aspects
include: (1) audition phenomena, (2) measurement techniques, (3) ac-
ceptability and tolerance standards; and, (4) consequences of control
efforts (i.e., safety implications of noise abatement flight procedures).
Safety "From both safety and flying qualities standpoint (of the
SST), the two-step noise abatement method is absolutely
intolerable;" 51 "Abatement procedures may have con-
tributed to several major accidents in the past 5 years. ,52tributed to several j  i t  i  t  t  r .
Effectiveness Negative public reaction* to noise may deter new trans-
port modes (VTOL) and inhibit congestion solutions (i.e.,
satellite airports; 90 movements per hour at JFK (with
noise abatement) vs. 150 movements per hour at O'Hare
(without noise abatement). 5
RANKING:
NASA
Mid 1/3
NON-NASA
Top 1/3
LITERATURE
Top 1/3
.'See figures below.
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FIGURE A-10 REACTIONS OF PEOPLE IN COMMUNITIES
EXPOSED TO AIRCRAFT NOISE ENVIRONMENTS OF 54
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FIGURE A-12 RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS IN COMMUNITIES WITHIN A
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PERCENTAGES OF PEOPLE RATING THEIR AREA AS A POOR, OR
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24. Turbulence (I-3)
The scope of this problem covers jet upsets and suspected
pilot/turbulence-induced structural overload. While jet upset problems
seem to be contained in current aircraft, doubt was expressed about the
applicability and effectiveness of solutions to future aircraft.
Safety Visual deterioration under certain conditions of
55
turbulence; 55 turbulence/pilot induced structural
56
overload; jet upsets and involvement of piloting
technique.
Effectiveness Passenger comfort with respect to ride quality (see
Problem 26 for discussion).
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
25. Sonic Boorn (III-5)
The boom consequences of commercial SST operations (over-
land) have been estimated at $37-86 million annually in damage claims.
The key, of course, is the word estimated; too little is known about how
people will react to the phenomenon, and research to date has been crit-
icized as being unrealistic and inconclusive (i. e. , pre-warned sub-
jects, no vibration; 34% felt 8-10 booms per day to be acceptable).
Cost Financial claims resulting from boom damage are estimated
at between $37 and $86 million annually (see Figure A-13).
Effectiveness Reaction of 25% - 50% of the people exposed to the antici-
pated boom would include extreme annoyance, complaints
to authorities, andlegal action (see Figure A-14).
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(Note: Sonic intensities are given in pounds per square foot (psf).)
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RANKING:
NASA
Top 1/3
NON-NASA
Mid 1/3
LITERATURE
Top 1/3
26. Insufficient Emphasis on Social Factors in Aviation (III-14)
Public acceptance problems with current and proposed ele-
ments of the air transport system are beginning to emerge -- the classic
case of course is noise. However, the problem is broader involving rejec-
tion of rotor equipped aircraft in favor of other modes, concern over safety
and current safety trends, and the "worth of" size and speed, i. e., 747 and
SST. The problem appears to be a lack of data and methods by which it
could be collected and applied in the design of air transport technology.
Effectiveness Design engineers of advanced aircraft must become
more conscious of employment factors and utility of
59their products; "Passenger acceptance of rotor-
equipped aircraft versus other types is a really fuzzy
area, and we can't get a handle on it"; gnawing doubts
6about the acceptability of jumbo size.about the acceptability of ju bo size.
RANKING:
NASA
Top 1/3
NON-NASA
Bottom 1/3
LITERATURE
Top 1/3
27. Attentiveness (IV-15)
Errors in control operation, substitution and forgetting
61
apparently account for 35% of pilot errors; lack of
cockpit discipline cited as a possible factor in surge in
62
landing accidents; omitted procedures found in
recent air carrier test. 63
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Safety
RANKING:
NASA
Top 1/3
NON-NASA
Top 1/3
LITERATURE
Top 1/3
28. Pilot Workload (I-7)
Excessive or heightened workload has been implicated as
an involved factor in landing accidents for all aircraft and in weather acci-
dents for private pilot. However, it is felt that excessive workload is not
the cause of accidents but rather the result of other factors at work. There-
fore, the reason for retaining this problem is not its status as an accident
cause but rather its utility in exploring other areas such as handling char-
acteristics, instrumentation, control configurations, etc., for new air-
craft and systems.
Safety Heightened workload identified as a factor in approach
and landing accidents. 6
Effectiveness Lack of workload measurement techniques and stan-
dards is inhibiting progress on advanced design air-
65craft generally 65 and their handling characteristics
in particular. 66
RANKING:
NASA
Top 1/3
NON-NASA
Mid 1/3
LITERATURE
Top 1/3
29. Stress (IV-8)
The problem concerns the relationship between physical (danger)
and non-physical (emotional) stress and its effect on immediate and long-
term human performance (see Figure A-15). Included are:
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The Sandia aircraft emergency scale.
FIGURE A-15 RELATIONSHIP OF HUMAN ERROR RATES AND
LEVELS OF STRESS FOR AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY SITUATION 6 7
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identification of indicators and measurement techniques as well as the
definition (data) of the relationships. Evidence of the importance/utility
of this topic to aviation is represented by some British work which defines
heart rate differentials between aircraft types, weather conditions, and
sophistication of airfield landing aids, all of which have possible implica-
tions for equipment design and operating criteria (e. g., should less credit
be given for VFR day, flights?)
Safety Therelationship between congestion-caused stress in
pilots/ground crews and unsafety is not known;6 8
contributing factor in recent crash was emotional state
brought on by preflight interaction of ground and flight
69
crew; relationship of pilots' "activity peak", strain
70
of flying and likelihood of performance errors.
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Bottom 1/3 Bottom 1/3
30. Human Factors Involvement in Aircraft Certification (I-25)
The occurrence of hearing impairments, vibration-induced back
ailments, dehydration problems, etc. may be cited as evidence that inade-
quate consideration is given to human factors in the certification process.
The solution lies in 1) the development of adequate human factors standards,
and 2) their inclusion as criteria in the certification of new aircraft.
Safety Human factors inadequacies have caused pilot-induced error
accidents and have not been identified during the certifica-
71tion process; flight test does a marginal job of identi-
fying hazardous (to be avoided) portions of the flight envel-
72
opes.
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NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Top 1/3 Top 1/3 Bottom 1/3
31. Use of Simulators in Checkouts and Proficiency (V-3)
Operating costs, safety restrictions, and occasional accidents
during training are factors which mitigate against using line aircraft for
training applications. The problem is to provide factual evidence to sup-
port an orderly transition from present air carrier practices to a more
complete use of simulator/synthetic trainers for all training and check-
out functions 10-15 years from now. While not so formally stated the
same goals seem appropriate to general aviation emphasizing refresher
and upgrading applications.
Safety Use of general aviation simulators may offer a means
of updating and checking private pilot proficiency. The
cost and lack of check pilots mitigates against doing
this in the air.
Cost In air carrier operations the high cost (and hazards)
of using line aircraft for training is forcing new uses
73
of "synthetic" ground trainers.
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Bottom 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
32. Task and Aircraft Design Simplicity (I-29)
In general aviation there appear to be two issues involved:
1) simplification as a means of reducing accidents/incidents, and
.. .
.. .
2) simpilification so as to encourage a broader usage of the private
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aircraft, i. e., reduce the amount of initial training and proficiency require-
ments. Regarding air carrier applicability comments were made about the
complexity of the regulations (for both ground controllers and aircrews);
the National Transportation Safety Board has recently called for simpli-
fication of crew duties during the descent before landing phase; and NASA
personnel urged caution regarding the use of "apparently" job simplifying
automation.
Safety As a result of increased landing accidents, National
Transportation Safety Board calls for simplifying crew
74duties; 74 simplicity called for in aircraft design and
/ ~~~~~~~75operating procedures to improve safety;7 5 pilots ques-
tion the benefits versus added complexity of proposed
76automation. 76
Effectiveness Simplification of private aviation to decrease profic-
iency requirement and encourage more widespread usage.77
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Mid 1/3 Top 1/3 Top 1/3
33. Cockpit Layout (I-15/16)
A recent government study compared accident/incident rates
of a large number of general aviation aircraft, and one of the factors impli-
cated in the high rate aircraft was faulty cockpit layout (i. e., human engineer-
ing). In air carriers numerous "convenience" complaints are still being
made about current aircraft although these have purportedly been rectified
for the upcoming generation.
A- 59
Cockpit layout (i. e., location and design of controls
and instrumentation) has been isolated as a contributing
factor in certain light aircraft accidents/incidents. 78
RANKING:
NASA
Bottom 1/3
NON-NASA
Bottom 1/3
LITERATURE
Bottom 1/3
34. Voice Communications (I-11)
Current and near future air traffic control concepts involve:
(1) a large amount of communications, i. e., Northeast Corridor opera-
tions require a full-time crew member to handle communications; and
2) a high chance for error. In addition to the hazard, workload and crew
size consequences, this situation limits the rate at which air traffic control
can process aircraft in the terminal area. The human factors aspects are
of two types: 1) establishing information exchange requirements, and
2) participating in thie selection and dcvelopnment of improved means,
e. g., data link.
Safety Excessive error possibilities in traffic control direc-
tions via voice communications. 79
Cost Full-time crew member required to man the radio dur-
ing corridor operations. 80
Effectiveness One of the limitations in terminal area capacity is the
time-consuming nature of current communication con-
81
cepts; high ground and air workload is also a consequence.
RANKING:
NASA
Bottom 1/3
NON-NASA
Top 1/3
LITERATURE
Top 1/3
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Safety
35. Readiness Self-Test (IV-14)
No information was found on this topic in the sample of lit-
erature; however, several apparently independent interview sources
expressed need to develop such a technique. Its suggested scope varied
from purely medical, to psycho-motor, to mental set; its main purpose
was, of course, safety and the self-administration aspect addresses the
question of how do you protect the (private) pilot from himself without
excessive restrictions?
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Bottom 1/3 Top 1/3 Bottom 1/ 3
36. Ego as a Factor in Aviation Accidents (IV-31)
The definition of this problem includes motivation (i.e., desire
to do well and inclination to "push" the limits to succeed) and the foolish-
ness acts of "flat hatting". In the first sense the problem is applicable to
all aircraft types; the second application is limited to the private pilot.
Safety Over-extending oneself because of desire to do
well; 8 2 inability to diagnose this factor may be
confounding accident conclusions. 8
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Bottom 1/3 Bottom 1/3 Bottom 1/3
37. Feedback of Accident-Incident Information (V-7)
Interest was not especially high for this problem but it was
retained for its strong safety implications and in view of a new incident
reporting program being initiated by the National Transportation Safety
Board. The crux of the problem is not so much the free exchange of
A-61
accident/incident data, which some sources think should be enhanced, but
rather an identification of the kinds of information that would be both obtain-
able and useful to operators and designers.
84
Safety As a means of educating the private pilot; as a diag-
nostic technique for aircraft design and air carrier oper-
85
ations 8
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Bottom 1/3 Bottom 1/3 Top 1/3
38. Operating and Training Manuals (V-8)
Regarding general aviation the problem relates to omitted,
incomplete or misleading information concerning hazardous portions of
the operating envelope and emergency procedures. For air carrier appli-
cations the problem appears to be concerned more with identification of
relevant information. In both cases the issue is information requirements.
Safety The problem is inadequate communication to the user;
specifically, ommitted, incomplete or misleading
information in the owner's handbook. 8
NASA NON-NASA LITERATURE
RANKING: Low 1/3 Low 1/3 Low 1/3
A-62
REFERENCES
1. Eberhard, J., Aircraft Handling Capacity of Controller Teams,
Contract No. FAA/BRD-301, January 1, 1963, p. 12.
2. Thomas, P. G., "Air Safety: Controlling Air Traffic," Space/
Aeronautics, May 1968, 49(5):81.
3. Leary, F., "How Safe is Air Travel?", Space/Aeronautics,
May 1968, 49(5):71.
4. Thomas, P. G., op. cit., p. 84.
5. Leary, F., op.cit., p. 73.
6. Willis, H. R. and Bryant, C. H., Human Factors in Flight
Emergencies, Memo Report, Aerospace Safety Engineering
Department, Marietta, Georgia, Lockheed-Georgia Co.,
April 1967.
7. Beck, R. H., "The Hostile Environment of Low Visibility,"
distributed at Fifteenth Air Line Pilots Association Air Safety
Forum, July 9-11, 1968.
8. Harper, C. W., "More Responsibility for Research in Air
Transportation," Astronautics & Aeronautics, January 1966,
p. 23.
9. Coleman, H. J., "Pilots to Demand More SST Operating Data,"
Astronautics & Aeronautics, January 1966, p. 69.
10. Plattner, C. M., "NASA Testing Variable-Stability PA-30,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 24, 1969, p. 87.
11. Thomas, P. G., op. cit., p. 76.
12. Harper, C. W., op. cit., p. 22.
13. Ruby, C. H., Statement before the Subcommittee on Advanced
Research and Technology of the Committee on Science and
Astronautics, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.,
October 3, 1968.
14. Kirchner, O. E., Critical Factors in Approach and Landing
Accidents: Part I - Statistics, Flight Safety Foundation, New
York, December 1960.
15. Beck, R. H., op. cit.
A-63
REFERENCES (CONTD.)
16. Anon, "Conflict over 737 Crew Size Intensifies," Aviation Week
& Space Technology, September 11, 1967, p. 37.
17. Herbert, E., "Transporting People, " International Science and
Technology, October 1965, p. 32.
18. Thomas, P. G., op. cit., p. 87.
19. NASA Interview.
20. Burnham, F., "SST Generates ATC Solution, " American Aviation,
February 3, 1969, p. 50.
21. Caldara, J. D., "Safety and the Pilot, " Flying Annual, 1967, p. 29.
22. Anon, "Piloting an Airplane may be Safer and Easier in the Future
Because of Space Age Discoveries," Flying Annual, 1967, p. 23.
23. NASA Interview.
24. Martin, R. W., "Area Navigation: The Shortest Distance between
Two Points, " FAA Aviation News, December 1968, p. 4.
25. Tench, WI. II-T., "Investigation of Crash of British Airplane,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 4, 1968, p. 87.
26. Doyle, B. C., Civil Air Carrier Crash Experience -- Limiting
Factors in Crash Survival and Escape, Department of Transportation,
National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D. C.; presented
to U.S. Air Force, Industry Life Support Conference, Las Vegas,
Nevada, November 28, 1967.
27. Thomas, P. G., op. cit., p. 84.
28. Meister, D. and Farr, D. E., The Utilization of Human Factors
Information by Designers, Nonr-4974-00, Bunker-Ramo Corp.,
December 16, 1965 - September 15, 1966.
29. Society of Experimental Test Pilots, 1968 Report to the Aerospace
Profession, twelfth symposium proceedings, Lancaster, California,
September 26-28, 1968, 9(2):249.
30. Anon, Flying Annual, May 1968.
31. Beck, R. H., "Revival of the One-Man Band, Air Line Pilot,
June 1967, p. 10.
A-64
REFERENCES (CONTD.)
32. Caldara, J. D., op.cit., p. 26.
33. Anon, "FAA Weighs Proficiency Checks, Added Training for
General Pilots," Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 1,
1968, p. 20.
34. Deaton, R., "The Case for Standardization of Commercial
Aircraft," Airline Management and Marketing, March 1967,
p. 45.
35. Anon, "South African Accident Investigation Report, Part 2:
Change in Takeoff Procedure Urged," Aviation Week & Space
Technology, February 3, 1969, p. 84.
36. Doty, L., "Giant Jets to Force New Concepts," Aviation Week
& Space Technology, November 20, 1967, p. 40.
37. Himmel, N. S., "Third Man in 737 Cockpit Costing United
$5 Million," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 17,
1969, p. 32.
38. Willis, H. R. and Bryant, C. H., op. cit.
39. Ibid.
40. Comments by J. O'Connel, Jr. and C. O. Miller in the article
by R. G. Shafer, "Safety in the Air: Recent Plane Crashes
Prompt Broad Search for New Safeguards," The Wall Street
Journal, February 19, 1969.
41. Kirchner, O. E., op. cit.
42. Nelson, R. F., "Dynamic Safety Program: AOPA Air Safety
Foundation Fact Sheet #22," AOPA Pilot, November 1967.
43. Anon, "Business Flying: National Aviation Training Program
Urged," Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 4, 1967,
p. 87.
44. ATA Interview.
45. ATA Interview.
46. NASA Interview.
47. ATA Interview.
A-65
REFERENCES (CONTD.)
48. Hartman, B. O., and Cantrell, G. K., "Sustained Pilot Performance
Required More than Skill," Aerospace Medicine, August 1967, pp.
802-803.
49. Willis, H. R. and Bryant, C. H., op. cit.
50. Carter, E. T., Letter to the Editor, Aviation Week & Space
Technology, December 23, 1968, p. 86.
51. Anon, "SST Problem Areas Need Fast Attention," American Aviation,
November 25, 1968, p. 55.
52. Leary, F., op. cit., p. 73.
53. Anon, "Kennedy Reaches Saturation Point, American Aviation,
July 22, 1968, p. 21.
54. Kryter, K. D., "An Example of 'Engineering Psychology:' The
Aircraft Noise Problem, " American Psychologist, April 1968,
23(4):243.
55. Anon, "Airline Observer," Aviation Week & Space Technology,
July 10, 1967, p. 47.
56. Legislative Reference Service, Policy Planning for Aeronautical
Research and Development, Document #90, Library of Congress;
prepared for Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C., May 19, 1966, p. 104.
57. Levy, L., "Levelight: A New Idea for Safety," The AOPA Pilot,
December 1967, p. 63.
58. Kryter, K. D., "Sonic Booms for Supersonic Transport, " Science,
January 24, 1969, Vol. 163, 360, 367.
59. Harper, C. W., op. cit., p. 24.
60. Anon, "Airline Observer," Aviation Week & Space Technology,
February 24, 1969.
61. Hartman, B. O. and Cantrell, G. K., "Psychologic Factors in
'Landing-Short' Accidents," taken from Table 1.
62. Shafter, R. G., "Safety in the Air: Recent Plane Crashes Prompt
Broad Search for New Safeguards," The Wall Street Journal,
February 19, 1969.
A-66
:~~~~~~~~~~~~~
..'.-.. . 
REFERENCES (CONTD.)
63. Himmel, N. S., op. cit., p. 32.
64. Kirchner, O. E., op. cit.
65. Harper, C. W., op. cit., p. 24.
66. NASA Interview.
67. Rigby, L. V. and Edelman, D. A., "A Predictive Scale of Aircraft
Emergencies," Human Factors, October 1968, 10(5):475-482.
68. Leary, F., op. cit., p. 69.
69. ATA Interview.
70. Mohler, S. R., Dille, J. R. and Gibbons, H. L., "The Time Zone
and Circadian Rhythms in Relation to Aircraft Occupants taking
Long-Distance Flights, " American Journal of Public Health,
August 1968, 48(8):1405.
71. Aircraft Design-Induced Pilot Error, National Transportation
Safety Board, Department of Transportation, Washington, D. C.,
PB # 175 629, July 1967.
72. Society for Experimental Test Pilots, op. cit., 9(2):144 and 252.
73. Hunter, G. S., "ATA Urges Advances in Flight Simulators,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 4, 1968, p. 58.
74. Shafer, R. G., op.cit.
75. AOPA Interview.
76. NASA Interview.
77. Harper, C. W., op. cit., p. 23.
78. PB #175 629, op. cit.
79. Buck, R., "The Cockpit," Forecasts of Air Transports Safety
Problem, 1970-80, J. Lederer, ed., ICAS 68-04; presented
at International Council of Aeronautical Sciences, Munich,
Germany, September 9-13, 1968.
80. Crossfield, A. S. and Oakes, T., "Area Navigation," Airline
Management and Marketing, May 1968, p. 50.
A-67
REFERENCES (CONTD.)
81. Thomas, P. G., op. cit., p. 77.
82. Hartman, B. O. and Cantrell, G. K., op. cit.
83. FAA Interview.
84. Caldara, J. D., op. cit., p. 29.
85. Seitz, C. P., ed., A Summary of the Flight Safety Foundation,
presented at the 19th Annual International Air Safety Seminar,
Madrid, Spain, November 15-18, 1966.
86. Society of Experimental Test Pilots, op. cit., p. 252.
A-68
